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Architecture, the City, and Nature: 
Part and Whole?
David Leatherbarrow
Despite all the differences that imme-
diately come to mind when natural and 
artificial landscapes are compared, we 
tend to believe that they are or should 
be similarly whole and entire, that 
each is best when characterized by 
unity. The same is true for individual 
buildings: each should be all-of-a-
piece. Obvious differences in size are 
neglected in this comparison, viewed 
instead are analogies in composition 
or make-up. Yet, wholeness in these 
cases is not simple, for it involves not 
only completeness (a full inventory of 
all the parts that are necessary for 
the ensemble’s “operations”) but 
also mutuality that constitu-
ent elements cooperatively 
complement one another 
because everything dis-
cordant or divergent has 
been eliminated. Unity in 








 In the second case per-
formance is at is-sue, the 
functional or mechanical 
operations of an arrangement. 
Such a configuration is whole and 
entire when it works as it should. The 
actual existence of urban, natural, or 
architectural unity can never really 
be known, however, for it is impos-
sible to actually perceive all the parts 
that make up a land- or cityscape. 
One reason for this is practical and 
concrete, cities and unbuilt terrains 
are so widely expansive that they 
always extend beyond one’s powers 
of observation, beyond the capacity 
of any single vantage to include more 
than a limited part of the whole. 
Another reason, less practical than 
ontological or constitutive, is that the 
elements that can be observed within 
any stretch of terrain always conceal 
other less obvious aspects, reces-
sive ones that are no less important 
because less apparent. Matching their 
outward extent, then, is an inward 
depth of topographies, a reserve or 
latent dimension that they keep within 
or for themselves to favor their own 
continuance. I will say more about 
this below, but at the outset want to 
observe that this inexplicit depth tends 
to escape the attention of architects. 
This may be because an architect’s 
normal concern is with the outwardly 
apparent aspects of objects or entities, 
the ones that give evidence of design 
intention. Yet, to the degree that this 
focus allows the recondite dimension 
of topographies to be neglected, the 
differences between perceptual faith 
and cognitive certainty will be con-
fused, as will be the different ways that 
natural and artificial topographies act 
as architecture’s primary horizon of 
stability and reference.
Viewing topography as if it were like 
architecture, as if it were architecture 
“writ large,” has ample and honorable 
precedent in architectural theory, for 
many architects have proposed that 
large and small configurations have 
analogous structures. Of the many 
authors one could cite on this common-
place, Aldo van Eyck may be the most 
helpful twentieth century proponent. 
Although he repeated himself on this 
point with some frequency, the version 
put forth at the Otterlo CIAM confer-
ence may be his sharpest statement of 
the principle: “We must stop splitting 
the making of a habitat into two dis-
ciplines—architecture and urbanism. 
Why? That’s a long story. A house must 
be like a small city if it’s to be a real 
house; a city like a large house if it’s to 
be a real city…The thought processes 
in planning cannot be divided on the 
basis of part–whole; small–large; 
few–many; i.e. into architecture and 
urbanism.”1 That the matter is not so 
simple becomes apparent as soon as 
the antecedents for the principle are 
studied. Van Eyck’s recent biographer, 
Francis Strauven, proposed that Van 
Eyck arrived at the analogy “indepen-
dently of Alberti,” but acknowledged, 
just the same, that there were both 
Renaissance and ancient anteced-
ents for the comparison, Alberti and 
Palladio in the first case, Plato and 
Aristotle in the second.2 Similarities 
there are, but also differences. 
In de Re Aedeficatoria Alberti wrote 
as follows: “If (as the philosophers 
maintain) the city is like some large 
house, and the house is in turn like 
“Only a horizon ringed about by 
myths can unify a culture.”
—Nietzsche 
“The Birth of Tragedy”
from The Spirit of Music
“It is the magical lights of the horizon, 
and the blue sky for the background, 
which save our works of art.”
—Emerson
Nature
Aldo van Eyck, 
Tree is Leaf and Leaf is Tree, 1962.
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some small city, cannot the various 
parts of the house—atria, xysti, dining 
rooms, porticoes, and so on—be con-
sidered miniature buildings? Could 
anything be omitted from any of these, 
through inattention and neglect, 
without detracting from the dignity 
and worth of the work?”3 Alberti’s list 
suggests unity meant completeness, 
but elsewhere in the text he stressed 
mutuality—functional interdepen-
dency—just as strongly. Nevertheless, 
while this version of the analogy seems 
identical to Van Eyck’s, the reflexivity 
of big and small is slightly imperfect, 
for Alberti’s elaboration exemplified 
the composite character of the house 
only, the compression and encamera-
tion of city-like situations within the 
domestic realm, not the expansion 
of domestic types into the city, or as 
the city. This asymmetry is important 
because it preserves the non-reflexivity 
of ancient versions of the analogy, an 
imbalance we ignore when we think 
of towns, neighborhoods, or urban 
blocks as “big architecture” and deploy 
techniques of the latter in the design 
and projection of the former: thus 
the legacy of much twentieth century 
design, fantastically rich houses and 
miserably poor cities. 
For Aristotle the bonds that bind 
male to female, or those that join 
the members of a family together 
are analogous to the ties between 
members of a community. So, too, for 
assemblies that are still larger, states. 
In each of these cases union assumes 
the concord of “those who cannot 
exist without each other.”4 Although 
dependency at each scale has slightly 
different purposes, a two-part cause 
of mutuality is apparent in each case: 
desire for self-sufficiency and for 
a good life— an ethically oriented 
functionality. Questions about the 
nature of a good or just life were also 
on Plato’s mind when he formulated 
the analogy. In the most famous of 
his three inquiries into the nature of 
a just state, The Republic, Plato had 
Socrates propose a method of detect-
ing the qualities of something small 
(man) in something large (the city): 
The inquiry we are undertaking is no 
easy one but calls for keen vision…
Since we are not clever persons, I 
think we should employ the method 
of search that we should use if we… 
were bidden to read small letters 
from a distance and then someone 
observed that these same letters 
exist somewhere larger and on a 
larger surface…
There is a justice of one man, we say, 
and I suppose, also of an entire city? 
Is not the city larger than the man… 
Then, perhaps, there would be more 
justice in the larger object and more 
easy to apprehend. If it please you, 
then, let us first look for its quality 
in states, and then only examine it 
also in the individual, looking for 
the likeness of the greater in the 
form of the less.5 Alexander Alland, Newark of the Present , 1936.  Estate of Alexander Alland, Sr.
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To see or understand justice in the 
individual it is best to look for it where 
it can be more easily apprehended, 
in the city, at least as a first step. 
This is the methodological correlate 
to the on-tological non-reflexivity I 
mentioned. Once this procedure is 
adopted the question then becomes: 
what makes a city just? Because the 
whole of Plato’s great dialogue attempts 
an answer to this question it would be 
silly to offer a short answer here. But 
one part of the answer can be noted, 
for it re-introduces the parallelism 
between large and small configura-
tions: a city is just when the majority 
pattern their lives after the conduct of 
the one whose soul has been shaped 
in conformity with an exemplary or 
divine pattern. Good cities result from 
a double mimesis: the philosopher/king 
imitates the gods, and citizens imitate 
the phil-osopher/king. For modern 
readers, particularly architects, this 
looks as if the small will be the key 
to the big (the statesman key to the 
state). But for that to be true one would 
have to overlook Plato’s reference to 
the gods and reduce the double to a 
single mimesis. 
Let me quote Plato once again in order 
to restate the analogy: “Must we not 
agree that in each of us there are the 
same forms and habits as in the polis?”6 
Eric Voegelin has introduced the term 
“anthropological principle” to describe 
this comparison. In explanation he 
observed that for Plato “the [human] 
psyche is a society of forces, and soci-
ety is the differentiated manifold of 
psychic elements.”7 Plato, like the 
architects I’ve mentioned, extended 
the analogy to architecture and cities: 
“if men must have a wall of sorts, they 
should construct their own dwellings 
from the outset in such a fashion that 
the whole town forms one unbroken 
wall, every dwelling house being 
rendered readily defensible. . . Such 
a town, with its resemblance to one 
great house, would be no unpleasing 
spectacle.”8 When we casually add to 
these passages the well-known com-
monplace from Protagoras—man is 
the measure of all things—we arrive 
at a statement of principle for archi-
tecture: the building is the measure 
of the city. Stated instrumentally: to 
design a city, or one of its districts, 
is to make a really big building. The 
continuum from small to medium to 
large and extra large is thus unbroken, 
and a wide spectrum of opportunity 
opens before the designer.
The problem with this conclusion is 
that Plato emphatically opposed the 
Protagorean dictum, he did not think 
the individual person is the measure 
of all things. We are not the measure 
but the gods. This extra-mundane 
reference is apparent in much dis-
cussed and often criticized parts of 
his philosophy—his theory of ideas 
and his struggle with the poets (who 
make copies of copies)—but also pres-
ent in topics that are often neglected, 
such as the nature of friendship and 
the causes of good health. Plato’s Robert Rauschenberg, Nightshift (Urban Bourbon), 1995.  Collection of the Artist.
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understanding of the analogy between 
the city and the human soul assumed 
that the order of the second was a 
configuration of “forces” that had its 
model in the archetype of the highest 
good.9 I’ve already noted that Aristotle, 
too, believed that communities were 
bound together in approximation of 
what was right for the majority. In both 
cases order was believed to have its 
foundation in a pattern that is above 
or beyond the nature of this or that 
individual. This premise is assumed 
in Plato’s summary statement about 
the formation of cities: 
good cities arise when citizens imitate 
individuals (rulers) who themselves 
imitate the gods, for only when the 
ruler’s mind is truly fixed on eternal 
realities [and] has no leisure to 
turn his eyes downward upon the 
petty affairs of men…[only when he] 
endeavors to fashion himself in their 
likeness and assimilate himself to 
them. . . [only then will] the lover of 
wisdom associating with the divine 
order become orderly and divine in 
the measure permitted to man. . . [If, 
then,] some compulsion is laid upon 
him to practice stamping on the 
plastic matter of human nature in 
public and private the patterns that 
he visions there. . . [we will see that] 
no city could ever be blessed unless 
its lineaments were traced by artists 
who used the heavenly model.10 
Again, a double mimesis. The second 
phrase of this quotation contains 
an important and difficult phrase: 
“to fashion himself in their likeness 
and assimilate himself to them.” 
That the two—forming a likeness 
and assimilating—are not the same 
is clear later in the text when Plato 
develops differences between imita-
tion and participation, mimesis and 
methexis. Imitation assumes parallel 
or analogous structures in the part and 
the whole, as do most architects when 
they seek to apply the analogy between 
buildings and cities. Participation, 
however, indicates approximation, 
a movement toward or involvement 
with that remains incomplete, the 
way the day, for example, participates 
in the light of the sun, achieving only 
some of its brightness, according to 
its limited measure. The point I want 
to stress, however, is not as subtle as 
the distinction between imitation and 
participation, it concerns only their 
extra-mundane referent: the city and the 
building, like the polis and the citizen, 
will be homologous if they take as their 
pattern something that transcends 
them—not something that is easy to 
grasp, because nearby or outwardly 
apparent, but something that keeps 
itself remote, something distant, or 
withdrawing, as I described it above. 
From this observation and argument 
I want to take neither ontology nor 
theology, but an insight into the kind 
of knowledge—faith (in architecture it 
will be perceptual faith)—one can have 
of phenomena that keep themselves 
distant, I mean the phenomena of 
topography, whether urban or rural.
Topography extends towards the 
horizon. “The horizon,” explains the 
philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer, “is 
the range of vision that includes every-
thing that can be seen from a particular 
vantage point.”11 The vision to which he 
refers is certainly perceptual, but not 
exactly perspectival, insofar as it is not 
oriented toward aesthetic objects, as 
perspective often is. Gadamer’s sense 
of horizonal vision is best thought of 
as “situational,” he describes a vision 
that operates in service of concrete 
involvements or for practical purposes. 
The word circumstances may be a 
helpful parallel, for it literally indi-
cates the arcing surround of a given 
standpoint. Within a town, typical 
configurations—streets, buildings, 
gardens, and open lots—modulate and 
measure the extension of both vision 
and topography toward the horizon. 
When they are densely configured these 
configurations conceal the horizon we 
take to be natural—the line where sky 
meets earth. From this a substitution 
follows: the ring of urban ensembles 
around a given vantage or situation 
takes the place of this more distant 
limit and is seen to confer orientation 
and position, as the natural limit would 
have done. One obvious difference 
between the two is dimensional, the 
radius of the first has decreased in 
dimension to form that of the second, 
meaning the edge has come closer 
to the center, the point where we are 
standing. But this substitution is not 
the only one that is possible, for the 
distance to the horizon can be reduced 
to such a degree that a single build-
ing can be understood as a person’s 
(proper or true) milieu. This means, 
again, the house is like the city. This 
nearer edge would not be a horizon 
of natural or urban but of domestic 
life. According to this premise, each 
person is most secure when at home. 
Richard Sennett has shown that this 
sentiment, now widely shared, took 
two centuries to develop as a massive 
transformation and impoverishment 
of the public realm.12 With this in 
mind, it seems to me that we should 
not presume equivalence between 
these three measures (the compass 
of the domestic, urban, and natural 
horizons), for reduced distance also 
means “narrowing” one’s horizon, and 
that means diminishing one’s world.
Each of these radii, these distances, 
can be seen as parts of one horizon if 
the term is not taken to mean a line 
at the edge of one’s visual field but the 
field itself. Accordingly, the horizon is 
not the mid-line of a picture in front of 
me but the (horizontal) plane on which 
I stand or move.13 This conception still 
allows the former to have importance, 
for the “horizon of horizons” will always 
be the distant limit of the plane of 
existence—where land or sea meets 
sky. Edmund Husserl, who introduced 
the term just quoted, identified this 
ultimate “frame of reference” with 
earth and discussed it in a paper on 
the spatiality of “nature.”14 The chief 
merit of the “horizontal horizon” (of 
thinking the horizon as the ground 
18
This means, however, that the rela-
tionship between figure and ground 
is not among objects. An even more 
important point can be concluded from 
this last one: the ground, so-called, 
is not a collection or configuration 
of objects at all; nor of elements, fig-
ures, or parts. Likewise, the terrain, 
town, or topography is not the sum 
of the objects that can be observed 
within it. A collection of buildings, 
no matter how great, no matter how 
well categorized or analyzed, is not 
a city, still less something natural. 
This—the non-object-like character 
of topography—is the most difficult 
point to grasp. 
Seen topographically the city is not a 
collection of buildings, let alone one 
big one, if by buildings one thinks of 
figures with permanently prominent 
status. The horizon is not what is seen 
but what withdraws in favor of what 
is seen. Earlier I described its conduct 
as a form of service, now of favor. In 
what, then, does this service consist? 
The answer to for architecture will 
begin to appear in analogy with the 
relationship between the individual 
person and his or her horizon.
Václav Havel, well before he became 
president of the Czech Republic, and 
before he achieved wide recogni-
tion as a playwright, considered the 
subject of “man’s horizon” in a few 
of the many letters he wrote to his 
wife Olga from prison, where he was 
confined for over four years as a result 
of his participation in the human 
rights movement known as Charter 
77. Writing in 1980 he observed that 
“in everything he does, man… relates 
to something outside himself… All his 
actions take place against the back-
ground of this horizon, which gives 
meaning to these actions, somewhat 
in the way the heavens make the stars 
what they are.”15 To exemplify what 
his horizon “gave” he explained that 
his simple act of drinking tea every 
afternoon was not an act undertaken 
for himself alone—for the sake of 
keeping his nerves intact during his 
confinement—but also for his wife, 
who would want him sane when he was 
finally released, for those near to him 
(friends and acquaintances) for the same 
reason; his community, and even for 
the “public” (which was waiting on his 
next play); in short, he sat alone in his 
corner drinking his little cup of tea for 
a world. “I do it for my world, or simply, 
for the world.” Relatedness is what 
the horizon gives, it favors reference. 
This is not unimportant, Havel said, 
life that was lacking in relationships 
would not be worth living, would be 
meaningless. This becomes especially 
clear in consideration of what Havel 
called the horizon’s “several layers.” 
First there is the horizon that is nearby, 
in his case the stonewalls imprison-
ing his vision but not imagination. 
The prison is an extreme instance of 
confinement. Such a physical horizon 
could equally well be the comforting 
or secure limits of a house or apart-
ment. These kinds of edges, however, 
conceal another horizon, one Havel 
had to imagine: “the infinitely more 
important real horizon of my exis-
tence—though it be distant.” The 
landscape he had in mind consisted 
of his memories, hopes, aspirations, 
fears, and so on—a psychological 
horizon. But even this one was not 
the limit of his “field of reference,” for 
there was a third layer, the horizon “as 
such,” the one that “abides.” This one, 
he observed, was even more hidden, 
more distant than the second. Yet, 
the “horizon of horizons”—the one 
he took to be “natural”—was not only 
the most difficult to grasp or the most 
concealed, but also the most certain 
and lasting. Seen together these three 
horizons favor interrelatedness by 
remaining increasingly more distant 
and withdrawn.
For both architecture and the city to be 
whole and entire they must participate 
in this withdrawing interrelatedness 
(of topography). The modes of this 
participation for urban architecture 
on which we stand and move, or the 
milieu of that movement) is that it 
allows for connections between the 
closer and more distant frames of 
reference: the house, city, and nature. 
Because connections (and discon-
nections) between them structure 
topographical continuity, because 
they make the world seem to be entire 
and all of a piece, they are the essential 
subject matter of architectural design. 
Architectural work does not involve 
the making of discrete objects but 
of relationships between settings of 
different dimension and degrees of 
permanence—furnishings, rooms, 
buildings, courts, gardens, and streets 
within even wider territories.
Does this mean architecture has the 
task of designing the horizon on which 
we stand and within which we move? Is 
the city that surrounds us a really big 
building? Is topography architecture 
“writ large?” Lastly, does topography 
so conceived include both built and 
unbuilt terrain—gardens and land-
scape? The whole matter, it seems to 
me, hinges on how one understands 
the horizon’s remote or withdraw-
ing characteristic—its distance (by 
which in this instance I do not mean 
something metric). 
The most obvious, and not entirely 
unhelpful way to think about topo-
graphical distance is to recall the 
figure-ground structure of perception: 
that figures achieve prominence over 
and against their ground when the 
latter “passes” beneath or behind them 
and remains marginal to one’s interest. 
Certainly the elements that make up 
this ground cannot be understood as 
figures while they render this service, 
for that would destroy the layering of 
the configuration, and thus its sense. 
But a change of interest on your part 
or mine—looking at the leaves not 
the tree, the door not the façade—can 
convert the relationship or invert the 
ranking and draw recessive figures 
out of the background, giving latent 
status to those that were prominent. 
will be less figurative than operational, 
for just as connectedness assumes 
mutuality, mutuality involves depen-
dency—elements “in service” of one 
another. I believe this mutuality is 
asymmetrical however, the implied 
reflexivity is imperfect. Whereas ana-
logical thinking discerns symmetrical 
structures (ratios) in the small and 
large, the principle of methexis or 
participation suggests irreversible 
directionality: the building takes 
its share of urban order and the city 
seeks to appropriate the structures 
of the natural horizon. If described 
as a double mimesis, this approxima-
tion needs to be seen as a task that 
in principle cannot be completed, 
for that is the only way the remote or 
distant character of the natural world 
can be preserved. Each of these three 
ensembles is a horizon, I’ve said, but 
the operations of the first and second 
(the building and city) are always sub-
tended by the prevenient and abundant 
givenness of the third (the horizon of 
horizons). I’ve said we tend to assume 
that the building is part of the city. No 
statement could be more obvious and 
more misleading. If the withdrawing 
character, the distance, of the horizon 
the city approximates—nature—is 
kept in mind, the differences between 
architecture and the city will be seen 
to be stronger than their similarity, 
or just as strong. I’m sure it is right 
that buildings are taken to be more 
prominent, more noticeable than their 
urban and natural horizons, but their 
participation in what remains distant 
should not be forgotten, nor should 
the extended be modeled on the local. 
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